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Abstract
In his economic writings Jevons insists on the allegedly fundamental role
played by the so-called “laws of supply and demand” in his theory of exchange;
yet no demand-and-supply analysis is actually employed in deriving such theory,
as developed in Chapter 4 of The Theory of Political Economy (TPE). This is all
the more puzzling in the light of the following two facts: 1) in his 1868 correspon-
dence with Jevons, Fleeming Jenkin provides a complete geometrical solution
of the exchange equilibrium problem based on the use of demand and supply
curves, but his suggestion is wholly neglected by Jevons in the first edition of
TPE (1871); 2) in his 1874 open letter to Jevons, Walras explicitly criticizes his
correspondent for his defective treatment of the ”laws of supply and demand”,
suggesting an alternative analytical solution of the exchange problem based on
the use of demand and supply functions; yet Jevons entirely disregards Walras’s
remarks in preparing the second edition of TPE (1879). This paper compares
Jevons’s, Jenkin’s and Walras’s approaches to the exchange equilibrium prob-
lem, explaining the analytical and epistemological reasons that underlie Jevons’s
neglect of his correspondents’ criticism and advice.
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1 Introduction
After sketching his main ideas in a few pages of a short paper publicly
delivered in 1862 and eventually published in full in 1866, W. Stanley Jevons
extensively develops his theory of exchange in Chapter 4 of his path-breaking
book, The Theory of Political Economy (henceforth TPE ), of which the rst
edition appears in 1871 (Jevons 1871) and the second one, the last during
the authors lifetime, in 1879 (Jevons 1879)1.
One of the most surprising features of Chapter 4 of TPE is that, in
spite of the reiterated emphasis laid by Jevons on the allegedly fundamental
role played by the so-called "laws of supply and demand" in his theory of
exchange, no formal demand-and-supply analysis (of either the functional
or the diagrammatic kind) is actually employed by the author in deriving
such theory nor, in spite of what Jevons himself occasionally claims (1970,
pp.143-4, 148), can be deduced from the formal statement of the theory, as
can be found in TPE. This peculiar aspect of Jevonss approach, repeatedly
noticed in the literature, has prompted a number of remarks, criticisms and
I wish to thank Yves Balasko and Aldo Montesano for their comments on a previous
draft of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 In the following, I shall chiey refer to the 1970 edition of TPE (Jevons 1870), edited
and introduced by R.D. Collison Black. The text of TPE in the 1970 edition is the same
as that of the fourth edition (Jevons 1911), which in turn is based on the text of the second
edition, as slightly revised and edited by Jevonss son, H.S. Jevons. The rst edition (1871)
will be explicitly referred to only when the di¤erences with the second and the following
ones are theoretically or historiographically relevant.
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attempted explanations or justications, giving rise to a lively debate, which
can be traced as far back as to Keyness review (1912) of the then recently
published fourth edition of TPE.
In fact, after recalling that Jevonss "earlier [1866] essay contains prac-
tically no reference [...] to diagrammatic methods", Keynes (1912, p. 80)
draws the readers attention to a "comment, [...] printed [...] for the rst
time [in 1911], appended by Jevons to Professor Fleeming Jenkins essay of
1870", where Jevons claims that "from about the year 1863 [he had] em-
ployed intersecting curves to illustrate the determination of the market price
in [his] lectures at Owens College" (Jevons 1911, p. 333). As Keynes slyly
seems to suggest in the last few lines of his review, Jevonss comment is
apparently unsubstantiated by any of Jevonss earlier or even later writings.
Hence, "[t]he historian of the early developments of mathematical economics
will have, if he goes beyond priority of publication, many puzzling problems
to determine. The above passage may possibly assist him in settling one of
them".
As a matter of fact, for the rst three quarters of a century after Keyness
initial hint, historians of economics and economic theorists alike have chiey
conned themselves to stress Jevonss inability to develop any true and
proper demand-and-supply analysis from his marginal utility theory and his
"equations of exchange", occasionally blaming such failure on his poor math-
ematical skills: see, in this vein, Keynes (1936, p. 138, fn. 2), Stigler (1950,
pp. 317-8), Brownlie and Prichard (1963, pp. 215-6), Ja¤é (1972, pp. 234-
5), Ja¤é (1976, 317-8), Black (1977c, p. X), Blaug (1985, p. 308). Over the
last two decades, however, a more varied picture has progressively emerged.
On the one hand, a number of scholars have strived to rehabilitate Jevonss
approach to demand theory and supply-and-demand analysis by putting
forward several diverse but complementary arguments: see, in particular,
Bostaph and Shieh (1987), Ekelund and Shieh (1989), Creedy (1992a) and
(1992b, pp. 119-140), Peart (1996, pp. 97-113), Creedy (1998a), (1998b)
and (1998c, pp. 29-33). On the other hand, other historians and theorists
have taken up again the criticisms traditionally levelled at Jevonss approach
in this respect, trying however to go more deeply than it had been common
beforehand into the epistemological foundations of Jevonss supposed failure:
see especially White (1989), (1994), 2001), and (2004).
Yet, in spite of such long-standing controversy, it does not seem that
the deepest analytical reasons underlying Jevonss modelling choices have
yet been spelled out in the literature. In the present paper I intend to ll
this gap by exploring the hypothesis that the startling lack of any demand-
and-supply analysis in Jevonss theory of exchange may be due to some
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basic di¢ culties surrounding the meaning and use of the equilibrium and
disequilibrium concepts in the so-called "marginalistic" or "neoclassical"
approach, an approach started precisely by Jevons with his writings of the
mid-1860s and early 1870s.
With a view to unraveling this entangled issue, it is convenient to com-
pare Jevonss theory of exchange, the only part of his overall theoretical
system on which I intend to focus attention in this paper, with the almost
contemporary theory of exchange developed by Léon Walras in his rst two
mémoires, published in 1874 and 1876, respectively, as well as in Section II
of the Eléments déconomie politique pure (henceforth Eléments), published
in two installments in 1874 and 1877, where the solution of the exchange
problem crucially rests on a fully-edged demand-and-supply analysis of the
traderschoices and behavior. As is well-known, since 1874 Walras repeat-
edly underlines, both in private correspondence with Jevons and in public
contributions to journals, books and collections of papers, that there exist
a few important di¤erences between his own approach and Jevonss, dif-
ferences that have somehow to do with the absence of a true and proper
demand-and-supply analysis in the latters approach. In view of this, it
may be interesting to explain why Jevons neither reacts to Walrass criti-
cal remarks, nor tries to revise his own account of the theory of exchange
in the second edition of TPE in such a way as to meet at least some of
Walrass criticisms and implicit or explicit suggestions. But, perhaps, it is
even more interesting to explain why Jevons does not apparently make any
e¤ort to incorporate into the rst edition of TPE at least some traits of the
almost complete demand-and-supply analysis that the engineer-economist
Fleeming Jenkin is able to put forward, in an impressive anticipation of a
few distinctive features of Walrass later approach, in a private exchange of
correspondence with Jevons taking place in 1868, i.e., well in advance of the
date (1870) in which Jevons will start to put in writing his rst draft of
TPE.
The paper will be structured as follows. In Section 2 I shall discuss the
conceptual apparatus underlying Jevonss theory of exchange, as put forward
in Chapter IV of TPE. Section 3 will be devoted to a formal statement of
such theory. The chief conceptual and analytical questions left unsettled by
Jevonss theory of exchange will be summarized in Section 4. In Section 5 I
shall state and discuss Walrass theory of exchange, as put forward in his rst
two mémoires and in the Eléments, especially focusing on the role played
by demand-and-supply analysis in the development of the theory. Section 6
will examine Walrass critique of Jevonss theory of exchange. Section 7 will
contrast Jenkins stance on the theory of exchange with Jevonss. In Section
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8 I shall compare Jenkins, Jevonss, and Walrass respective positions on
the role of demand-and-supply analysis in the theory of exchange. Section
9 concludes.
2 Jevonss theory of exchange: the conceptual ap-
paratus
In order to facilitate both the exposition and the discussion of Jevonss the-
ory of exchange, our immediate objective in this and the following two Sec-
tions, and especially its comparison with Walrass and Jenkins approaches,
a task that will be undertaken in Sections 5 to 8 below, it is convenient to
adopt a common symbolic notation, conforming to contemporary standards.
Hence, both here and in the following, we shall stick to the formalism to be
introduced now. When necessary, and without further notice, this formal-
ism will replace, even in textual quotations, the one originally employed by
the authors concerned, often unacceptable nowadays; on no occasion, how-
ever, such replacement will entail any substantive alteration of the original
assumptions or propositions.
Let us then consider a pure-exchange economy with a nite number
L  2 of commodities, denoted by l = 1; :::; L, and a nite number I  2 of
consumers-traders (henceforth indi¤erently referred to as either consumers
or traders), denoted by i = 1; :::; I. Each consumer i is characterized by
a consumption set Xi = fxi  (x1i; x2i; :::; xLi)g = RL+, a utility function
ui : Xi ! R, and endowments !i  (!1i; !2i; :::; !Li) 2 RL+n f0g. Let x =
(x1; :::; xI) 2 X = Ii=1Xi  RLI+ be an allocation;
_
! = (!1; !2; :::; !L) =PI
i=1 !i 2 RL++ the aggregate endowments; ALI =
n
x 2 X jPIi=1 xi = _!o
the set of feasible, non-wasteful allocations. A pure-exchange economy with
these characteristics will be denoted by ELI =
n
(Xi; ui () ; !i)Ii=1
o
in the
following. When L = 2 and I = 2, the pure-exchange, two-commodity, two-
consumer economy E22 =
n 
R2+; ui () ; !i
2
i=1
o
will be called an Edgeworth
Box economy, after Edgeworth (1881).
In the rst thirteen Sections of Chapter IV of TPE, and especially
in the two central analytical Sections, respectively entitled "The Theory
of Exchange" and "Symbolic Statement of the Theory", Jevons discusses
what is to all analytical purposes an Edgeworth Box Economy, E22J =n 
R2+; ui () ; !i
2
i=1
o
, satisfying a few further specic assumptions concern-
ing the tradersendowments and utility functions. As to the endowments,
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both traders are assumed to be "cornered", that is, to hold a positive quan-
tity of one commodity only; specically, in the following we shall assume:
!1 = (!1; 0) and !2 = (0; !2). As to the utility functions, each consumer
i is supposed to be characterized by a cardinal, additively separable utility
function, that is:
ui(xi) = v1i(x1i) + v2i(x2i);8xi 2 Xi; i = 1; 2.
Moreover, the utility functions are (tacitly) assumed in this part of Chap-
ter IV to be twice continuously di¤erentiable and to satisfy the following re-
strictions on the signs of the rst- and second-order pure partial derivatives:
rui(xi) =

@ui (xi)
@x1i
;
@ui (xi)
@x2i

= (v01i(x1i); v
0
2i(x2i)) >> 0;8xi 2 Xi; i = 1; 2
and
@2ui (xi)
@x21i
;
@2ui (xi)
@x22i

= (v001i(x1i); v
00
2i(x2i)) << 0;8xi 2 Xi; i = 1; 2.
Given the additive separability assumption, the rst-order partial derivative
of is utility function with respect to commodity l, representing the marginal
utility function (Jevonss "degree of utility" function) of commodity l for
consumer i, turns out to be a function of the quantity of commodity l only.
The above inequalities therefore imply that consumer is marginal utility
functions are positive and monotonically decreasing throughout, for i = 1; 2
and l = 1; 2.
Let us now consider an "act of exchange" taking place between the two
traders. Such an "act" involves the exchange of either "innitely small" or
"nite" quantities of the two commodities (Jevons, 1970, pp. 138-9): it will
be called di¤erentialin the former case and nitein the latter. In either
case the quantity of the commodity given in exchange will be taken to be
negative (that is, dxli < 0 or xli < 0, if commodity l is given by trader
i, for i; l = 1; 2), while the quantity of the commodity received in exchange
will be taken to be positive (that is, dxli > 0 or xli > 0, if commodity l is
received by trader i, for i; l = 1; 2). Since an "act of exchange" is necessarily
bilateral, the vectors of the quantities traded satisfy the following conditions:
(dx11; dx21) =  (dx12; dx22), if the "act" is di¤erential; (x11;x21) =
 (x12;x22), if the "act" is nite2. Finally, let dxl = jdxlij (resp., xl =
2Referring to J. S. Mills analysis of demand and supply, Jevons (1970, p. 143) writes:
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jxlij) be the absolute value of the quantity exchanged of commodity l in a
di¤erential(resp., nite) "act of exchange"; then, following Jevons (1970,
pp. 138), a ratio of the type dx2dx1 =
dx21dx11  = dx22dx12  > 0 (resp., x2x1 =x21x11  = x22x12  > 0) will be called a di¤erential(resp., nite) "ratio of
exchange". As we shall see, a special kind of nite"ratio of exchange" plays
a fundamental role in Jevonss theory of exchange: it is the nite"ratio"
x2
x1
, where x1 =  x11 =  (x11 !11) = !1 x11 = x12 = x12 !12 = x12
and x2 =  x22 =  (x22   !22) = !2   x22 = x21 = x21   !21 = x21.
Given an Edgeworth Box economy E22J =
n 
R2+; ui () ; !i
2
i=1
o
, satisfy-
ing the above assumptions on endowments and utilities, for each consumer
one can dene a concept that will prove of some use in the following. Pre-
cisely, let consumer is marginal rate of substitution of commodity 2 for
commodity 1 when is consumption is xi, MRSi21(xi), be dened as the
quantity of commodity 2 that consumer i would be willing to exchange for
one unit of commodity 1 at the margin, in order to keep his utility unchanged
at the original level ui(xi). From this denition it follows that:
MRSi21(xi) 
dx2idx1i

ui(xi+dxi)=ui(xi)
=
@ui(xi)
@x1i
@ui(xi)
@x2i
=
v01i(x1i)
v02i(x2i)
; i = 1; 2.
In his writings Jevons ignores the notion of the marginal rate of substitution.
Yet, he does know and systematically employ the notion of the marginal
utility of commodity l for consumer i, which, under the stated assumptions
on the properties of the utility functions, is well-dened and bounded away
from 0 everywhere in the consumption set. Moreover, though not explicitly
discussing the concept of the marginal rate of substitution as such, he does
implicitly make use of it in his analysis, since he computes the ratios of the
values of the marginal utility functions of either consumer corresponding to
specic consumption bundles and examines the role of such ratios in solving
the exchange equilibrium problem.
As already recalled, the conceptual apparatus and analytical framework
summarized above underlie the initial part of Chapter IV or TPE, i.e., the
rst thirteen Sections of that Chapter. Yet, in the following seven Sections
Mills equation [...] states that the quantity of commodity given by A is
equal to the quantity received by B. This seems at rst sight to be a mere
truism, for this equality must necessarily exist if any exchange takes place
at all.
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of Chapter IV, starting from that entitled "Problems in the Theory of Ex-
change", Jevons tries to extend the scope of his analysis in various directions,
by relaxing both the assumptions dening the Edgeworth Box economy and
some of the special assumptions concerning the traderscharacteristics (con-
sumption sets and utility functions): in particular, in the Sections entitled
"Complex Cases in the Theory", "Competition in Exchange" and "Acquired
Utility of Commodities" (Jevons, 1970, pp. 152-5 and 168-70), he examines
exchange economies with more than two traders and/or more than two com-
modities; in the Sections entitled "Problems in the Theory of Exchange",
"Failures in the Equations of Exchange" and "Negative and Zero Value"
(Jevons, 1970, pp. 150-2 and 155-66), he drops or relaxes either the as-
sumption that commodities be perfectly divisible, or the assumptions that
the utility functions be continuous or di¤erentiable, or nally the assump-
tions on the signs of the derivatives of the utility functions. While at the end
of the next Section of this paper we shall briey discuss some of Jevonss
attempts at generalizing his approach, up until then we shall conne our
attention to the core of Jevonss theory of exchange, as it emerges from the
rst thirteen Sections of Chapter IV of TPE.
As already explained, the formal model employed in the initial part of
Chapter IV unambiguously refers to an Edgeworth Box economy, exhibit-
ing the special features mentioned above. Yet, the verbal interpretation of
the model, as put forward by Jevons in the three Sections that immediately
precede the analytical statement of the theory, i.e., the Sections respectively
entitled "Denition of Market", "Denition of Trading Body", and "The
Law of Indi¤erence" (Jevons, 1970, pp. 132-9), is not free of major am-
biguities. At least three of them, signicantly a¤ecting Jevonss modelling
choices, must be discussed before embarking upon an examination of the
model proper: the rst ambiguity concerns the very notion of a trader or,
to use Jevonss expression, of a "trading body"; the second has to do with
the time structure of the analysis, or the distinction between "statics" and
"dynamics"; the third concerns what Jevons calls, in the second edition of
TPE, the "law of indi¤erence"3.
As to the "trading body" concept, Jevons provides the following elusive
denition:
By a trading body I mean, in the most general manner, any body
either of buyers or sellers. The trading body may be a single
individual in one case; it may be the whole inhabitants of a
3 In the rst edition the same "law" had been labelled as the "principle of uniformity";
see Jevons (1871, p. 99).
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continent in another; it may be the individuals of a trade di¤used
in a country in a third. (Jevons, 1970, p. 135)
So Jevonss "trading body" can be either an individual decision maker,
in conformity with the standard contemporary interpretation of the concept
of a trader, or an aggregate of individuals. But, at least at rst, also the
aggregative interpretation of the concept is apparently justied by Jevons
on individualistic grounds. For, a few lines after the previous sentence, he
writes:
We must use the expression with this wide meaning, because the
principles of exchange are the same in nature, however wide or
narrow may be the market considered. Every trading body is
either an individual or an aggregate of individuals, and the law,
in the case of the aggregate, must depend on the fullment of
law in the individuals. (Jevons, 1970, p. 135)
Yet, not even this sort of individualistic justication is entirely satisfac-
tory, after all, for
the economic laws representing the conduct of large aggregates
of individuals will never represent exactly the conduct of any
one individual. If we could imagine that there were a thousand
individuals all exactly alike [...], then the average laws of supply
and demand deduced from the conduct of such individuals would
agree with the conduct of any one individual. But a community
is composed of persons di¤ering widely in their powers, wants,
habits and possessions. In such circumstances the average laws
applying to them will come under what I have elsewhere called
the Fictitious Mean, that is to say, they are numerical results
which do not pretend to represent the character of any existing
thing. (Jevons, 1970, p. 136; see also p. 86)
As can be seen, when the "trading body" concept is interpreted as an
"aggregate of individuals", Jevons wavers between two alternative positions:
on the one hand, he would like to endorse the idea that the law ruling the
behavior of such an aggregate can be exactly deduced from the laws ruling
the behavior of the individuals composing it; on the other hand, however, he
is apparently prepared to recognize that such an exact deduction can only
be hoped for in the special case in which all the individuals are alike, so
that in all practical cases one has to put up with the "Method of Fictitious
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Means", according to which the laws governing the conduct of the aggregate
are average laws that cannot be exactly traced back to the laws governing
the conduct of the individuals.
This ambiguity is never dispelled by Jevons. As a matter of fact, in
dealing with the formalized part of his theory, he invariably interprets the
two "trading bodies" appearing in it as if they were two individual decision
units, a stance that we shall adopt in the following. Yet, he never gives up
the alternative interpretation of a "trading body" as an aggregate, without
specifying, however, whether the laws of the aggregate can or cannot be for-
mally deduced from the laws of the individuals. The fact is that Jevons needs
both interpretations, for reasons that will become clear in the following.
As to the time structure of the analysis, Jevons may appear, at rst
sight, to hold a well-dened methodological stance, which directly inspires
his modelling choices in the theory of exchange:
We must carefully distinguish [...] between the statics and the
dynamics of this subject. The real condition of industry is one
of perpetual motion and change. [...] If we wished to have a
complete solution of the problem in all its natural complexity,
we should have to treat it as a problem of motion - a problem of
dynamics. But [...] it is only as a purely statical problem that
I can venture to treat the action of exchange. Holders of com-
modities will be regarded not as continuously passing on these
commodities in streams of trade, but as possessing certain xed
amounts which they exchange until they come to equilibrium.
(Jevons, 1970, 138)
From this passage the following prescriptions seem to emerge with rea-
sonable clarity: rst, Jevonss theory of exchange is deliberately restricted
to the "statics of the subject"; secondly, to take a statical view of the ex-
change problem means, for Jevons, to regard the "holders of commodities
[...] as possessing certain xed amounts" of the same commodities, and pre-
sumably also as being characterized by xed preferences, and consequently
to "determine the results of exchange" under the assumption of xed data
(Jevons, 1970, p. 143); thirdly, since the traders are explicitly said to "ex-
change until they come to equilibrium", it would appear that, according to
Jevons, the analysis of the equilibration process is not inconsistent, at least
in principle, with the "statics of the subject", provided that the data of the
economy are not allowed to change during the process.
Yet this liberal interpretation of the statical method is immediately dis-
avowed by Jevons himself. The need to give up the analysis of the equi-
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libration process is initially justied on practical grounds, as the following
sentence shows:
It is much more easy to determine the point at which a pendulum
will come to rest than to calculate the velocity at which it will
move when displaced from that point of rest. Just so, it is a far
more easy task to lay down the conditions under which trade is
completed and interchange ceases, than to attempt to ascertain
at what rate trade will go on when equilibrium is not attained.
(Jevons, 1970, p. 138)
Yet, contrary to what some commentators seem to believe (see, e.g.,
Peart (1996, pp. 74, 82)), this is not yet the end of the story. For the con-
traposition between the statics and the dynamics of the exchange problem
is after all much more dramatic than it would appear from the mechanical
analogy of the pendulum recalled in the above passage: for in mechanics
there is no theoretical, but only a practical, distinction between the statical
and the dynamic perspective; on the contrary, in economics the contrast be-
tween the two methods is also theoretical, implying that some dynamic tools
are precluded to statics and that, for this reason, the equilibration process
cannot fall under the jurisdiction of statical analysis. All this, according
to Jevons, has to do with the fundamental distinction, already introduced
above, between two alternative interpretations of the "ratio of exchange"
concept, namely, the di¤erentialinterpretation and the niteone:
Strictly speaking, the ratio of exchange at any moment is that
of dx2 to dx1, of an innitely small quantity of one commodity
to the innitely small quantity of another which is given for it.
The ratio of exchange is really a di¤erential coe¢ cient.
But, this being said, the di¤erence between the statics and the dynamics
of the exchange problem
will present itself in this form: dynamically we could not treat
the ratio of exchange otherwise than as the ratio of dx2 and
dx1, innitesimal quantities of commodity. Our equations would
then be regarded as di¤erential equations, which would have to
be integrated. But in the statical view of the question we can
substitute the ratio of the nite quantities x2 and x1. (Jevons,
1970, p. 138)
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A clarication of Jevonss confused sentences on the respective jurisdic-
tions of statics and dynamics in the theory of exchange has to be postponed
to Section 8 below, where we shall also explain why Jevons takes such a wa-
vering position on whether or not the analysis of the equilibration process
can be part of the statics of the subject. Here we want to draw the readers
attention to Jevonss cryptic statement that, "in the statical view of the
question", the nite "ratio of exchange", x2x1 , can be substituted for the
di¤erentialone, dx2dx1 . Such substitution, as we shall see in a moment, plays
a crucial role in Jevonss solution of the exchange problem. This is probably
the reason why Jevons tries to justify it not only, as we have just seen, as a
peculiar trait of statics, but also as a sort of by-product of "a general law of
the utmost importance in economics", which Jevons eventually proposes to
call "the law of indi¤erence" (Jevons, 1970, p. 137). Now, as already men-
tioned above, such "law" is the third highly ambiguous concept on which
Jevons erects his theoretical system. Hence, before coming back to the issue
of the justication that the "law" is supposed to provide to the proposed
substitution of x2x1 for
dx2
dx1
, it is necessary to elucidate the meaning of the
"law" itself.
When the "law" is rst introduced (without mentioning its name), its
meaning is explained as follows:
A market [...] is theoretically perfect only when all traders have
perfect knowledge of the conditions of supply and demand, and
the consequent ratio of exchange; and in such a market, as we
shall now see, there can only be one ratio of exchange of one
uniform commodity at any moment. (Jevons, 1970, pp. 133)
On the contrary, when, a few pages later, the "law" is named and ex-
plicitly dened, its meaning is explained as follows:
When a commodity is perfectly uniform or homogeneous in qual-
ity, any portion may be indi¤erently used in place of an equal
portion: hence, in the same market, and at the same moment,
all portions must be exchanged at the same ratio. [...] Hence fol-
lows what is undoubtedly true, with proper explanations, that
in the same open market, at any one moment, there cannot be
two prices for the same kind of article. (Jevons, 1970, pp. 136-7;
Jevonss italics)
These two denitions prompt the following three remarks. In the rst
place, Jevons is uncertain as to how the fundamental implication of his "law
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of indi¤erence" ought to be specied: while on many occasions he asserts
that the "law" implies the sameness of the "ratio of exchange of one uniform
commodity", on a few other occasions, instead, he speaks of the sameness
of the "price" of such a "uniform commodity"4. Yet, except for the Sec-
tions discussing the "law", no mention of the "price" concept is made in
the remainder of Chapter IV, where the concept of a "ratio of exchange" is
employed in the entire discussion of the formal model: the relationship ex-
isting between "prices" (always understood as "money prices") and "ratios
of exchange" is spelled out only in a Section of Chapter V of TPE entitled
"Relations of Economic Quantities" (1970, pp. 203-5), where Jevons dis-
cusses the relations between his own terminology and the expressions used
in either preexisting theories or every-day language. Jevonss occasional use
of the term "price" in discussing the "law" is probably due to his perceiving
how odd it may appear to speak of the sameness of the "ratio of exchange
of one uniform commodity", without even mentioning the other commodity
with which the rst is supposed to be exchanged. As we shall see, the ab-
sence of the "price" concept in the statement of the theory of exchange is
one of the fundamental weaknesses of Jevonss approach.
In the second place, Jevons is careful in specifying that the "law" holds
"at any one moment", but typically does not hold over time:
Though the price of the same commodity must be uniform at
any one moment, it may vary from moment to moment, and
must be conceived in a state of continual change. Theoretically
speaking, it would not usually be possible to buy two portions of
the same commodity successively at the same ratio of exchange
[...]. (Jevons, 1970, p. 137)
In the third place, the "law" is explicitly said to hold in a "perfect" or
"open" market. But a "market", in turn, is dened in such a demanding
way, as far as the tradersknowledge and motivations are concerned, as to
turn the "law" into a statement which is "undoubtedly true, with proper
explanations", that is, into an almost tautological statement:
4 It might be noted that Cournot (1838, pp. 51-2, fn.), in a much earlier statement of
a principle somehow anticipating Jevonss "law", had dened a "market", in the sense of
economic theory, as a "territory" where "prices [...] take the same level throughout, with
ease and rapidity". The relevant passage from Cournots Recherches is quoted by Jevons
in the second edition of TPE (1970, pp. 132-3, fn.). It should be noted, however, that
Jevons becomes acquainted with Cournots writings only after the publication of the rst
edition of TPE.
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By a market I shall mean two or more persons dealing in two
or more commodities, whose stocks of those commodities and
intentions of exchanging are known to all. It is also essential
that the ratio of exchange between any two persons should be
known to all the others [...] and there must be perfectly free
competition, so that anyone will exchange with anyone else for
the slightest apparent advantage. (Jevons, 1970, p. 133)
It is clear that Jevons would have liked to be able to prove the "law" as
a theorem, starting from more primitive assumptions on tradersknowledge,
motivations and kinds of market interaction. But he is unable to do so: in
particular, there is no attempt in Chapter IV of TPE to employ those "ar-
bitrage" conditions that had already been successfully exploited by Cournot
for similar purposes in Chapter III of his Recherches5. So, in the end, Jevons
piles up assumptions on the characteristics of the traders and the function-
ing of the market which are never really used to prove anything, but have
the only purpose of making the "law" plausible.
3 Jevonss theory of exchange: a formal statement
This is particularly evident when one looks at the chief analytical use to
which Jevons puts the "law". Such use, as already mentioned, has to do with
the relation between di¤erentialand nite"ratios of exchange". In fact,
after asserting that, "in the statical view of the question", the di¤erential
"ratio", dx2dx1 , can be replaced by the nite one,
x2
x1
, Jevons continues as
follows:
Thus, from the self-evident principle, stated on p. 137, that
there cannot, in the same market, at the same moment, be two
di¤erent prices for the same uniform commodity, it follows that
the last increments in an act of exchange must be exchanged in
the same ratio as the whole quantities exchanged. [...] This result
we may express by stating that the increments concerned in the
process of exchange must obey the equation
5See Cournot (1838, pp. 29-43). It is ironic that, in the Preface to the second edition of
TPE, Jevons (1970, p. 58) should qualify Chapter III of Cournots Recherches, where the
theory of arbitrage is fully developed in the context of a discussion of foreign exchanges,
as "not particularly useful".
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dx2
dx1
=
x2
x1
(1)
(Jevons 1970, p. 139; Jevonss italics)
Now, in this application of the "law", which is by far the most important
one from Jevonss own viewpoint, the "law of indi¤erence" really boils down
to a trivial truism. First of all, the "law" is supposed to apply to an "act
of exchange", which it is indeed di¢ cult to regard as an event involving
more than two individual traders, where "two commodities are bartered in
the ratio of x1 for x2", x1 and x2 being the nitetraded quantities of the
commodities concerned. Then the result is simply obtained by observing
that "every mth part of x1 is given for the mth part of x2, [...] so that,
at the limit, even an innitely small part of x1 must be exchanged for an
innitely small part of x2, in the same ratio of the whole quantities", which is
indeed a platitude. Yet, it should be noted that this application of the "law",
however trivial, does all the same set one specic constraint on the allowable
interpretation of equation (1), a constraint that unfortunately Jevons tends
sometimes to forget: for, since the "law" holds "at one moment" and the
"act of exchange" is instantaneous as well, Jevons should not feel authorized
to speak of "the increments concerned in the process of exchange", unless
he were thinking of an "instantaneous process", which is a contradiction in
terms6.
6 In the whole, however, Jevons seems to be well-aware of the "instantaneous" character
of any single "act of exchange", hence also of the "law of indi¤erence" as expressed by
equation (1), where the di¤erentialratio must not be taken as a function of time, at least
according to the only interpretation of that equation that Jevons is willing to endorse.
This conclusion is indirectly conrmed by a careful perusal of the Notes of the Lectures
on Political Economy given by Jevons at Owens College, Manchester, during the academic
year 1875-6. These Notes, to which I shall come back in Section 8 below, were taken by
Harold Rylett, a student in the course on Political Economy given by Jevons during his last
year as Professor at Owens College. Consulted by Keynes when still in handwritten form
in view of the preparation of Jevonss biographical sketch (Keynes 1936, p. 138), Ryletts
Notes were later edited by R.D.C. Black and made available as Vol. VI of the Papers
and Correspondence of William Stanley Jevons (Black 1977c). While Rylett occasionally
misreported or misinterpreted Jevons, his Lecture Notes, warmly praised by Jevons himself
(Black 1977c, p. VIII), provide illuminating insights on Jevonss thought processes and
ideas. Hence the following passage, referring to a relation equivalent to equation (1)
above, proves useful in understanding Jevonss own interpretation of the "law", which is
remorselessly "instantaneous":
This is perhaps not always true. It is not really true if sales take place in
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After such a toilsome introduction of the main conceptual tools, Jevons
eventually sets out to derive the competitive equilibrium conditions for his
model, called the "equations of exchange". He starts by asking "at what
point the exchange will cease to be benecial" for the traders. After point-
ing out that such "question must involve both the ratio of exchange and the
degrees of utility", he provides a tentative answer by developing a specic
numerical example. Assuming, "for a moment", that the ratio of exchange"
between two commodities be "established" at a given level, he verbally ar-
rives at the conclusion that the benets from exchange for either trader cease
when the ratio of each traders "degrees of utility" is equal to the inverse
of the di¤erential "ratio of exchange" of the two commodities, which in
turn is assumed to be equal to "the established ratio of exchange". The
"point" so determined is called the "point of equilibrium" by Jevons (1970,
pp. 139-40).
Now, there is a surprising omission in Jevonss introductory discussion
of the determination of the so-called "point of equilibrium": for, since the
provisionally "established ratio of exchange" is generally not what would
currently be called a competitive equilibrium "ratio", the quantities of
commodities that the traders want to exchange at Jevonss "point of equi-
librium" cannot generally be exchanged; but not a single word is uttered by
Jevons about this eventuality and its possible consequences.
Similarly surprising is the diagram (Fig. 5 of TPE, reproduced as Fig. 1
below) used to illustrate the verbal argument. Even if Jevons (1970, p. 140)
makes it clear from the beginning that "it is hardly possible to represent
this theory completely by means of a diagram", all the same the only dia-
gram actually employed for this purpose is much more disappointing than
one might reasonably have expected: rst of all, this diagram represents
the marginal utility curves of one single trader, while the surrounding ver-
bal discussion concerns both; in the second place, the two marginal utility
curves, drawn with respect to rotated horizontal axes and superposed on
one another, are said to identify the "point of equilibrium" of the trader
concerned by means of their "point of intersection", under the assumption
that "the ratio of exchange [...] be that of unit for unit, or 1 to 1". But, once
again, nothing is said about the reason for selecting precisely that "ratio of
exchange" or about the consequences of that selection, in the likely case the
succession to one another. [...] But that is not the question here, because
these sales are not successive. Here we are looking at exchange which takes
place at the same time, as it were, and in that case the whole quantities wd.
be sold at the same price. (Black 1977c, p. 88; italics added)
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"1 to 1 ratio" were not what would be referred to, in current terminology,
as the competitive equilibrium"ratio".
Fig. 1
While postponing a full explanation of these bewildering omissions to
Section 8 below, let us now examine how Jevons, taking for granted that
equation (1) holds, eventually proceeds to determine the equilibrium condi-
tions for his Edgeworth Box economy, E22J =
n 
R2+; ui () ; !i
2
i=1
o
, in the
Section of Chapter IV of TPE entitled "Symbolic Statement of the Theory".
Right at the beginning of this Section, Jevons points out that the subse-
quent discussion will concern what is supposed to hold "in a state of equi-
librium" (1970, p. 141). Now, as we have just seen, the expression "point
of equilibrium" had been loosely used by Jevons in the preceding page (p.
140) to denote the tradersutility maximizing choices at an arbitrarily given
"ratio of exchange". Yet, from the nature of the argument developed in
the Section starting on p. 141, it is clear that Jevons is now employing the
"equilibrium" concept in a much stricter sense, corresponding to what would
be termed a competitive equilibriumnowadays7. Thus, in order to make
our account of Jevonss theory more understandable, we shall employ the
expression competitive equilibriumwhen the context unmistakably calls
for it, even if Jevons nowhere makes use of that expression. Hence, letting
7We use this expression for want of better terms. As will be seen in Section 6 below,
however, the traders behavior underlying Jevonss "equations of exchange" cannot be
qualied as competitivein the current (Walrasian) sense of the word.
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x1 and x2 be the quantities of the two commodities traded in such a com-
petitive equilibriumstate, x

2
x1
turns out to be the competitive equilibrium
nite"ratio of exchange". Given the assumptions on the traderscharac-
teristics, one obviously has: x1 = s11 = d12 and x2 = d21 = s22, where
s11 = !1  x11 and d12 = x12 are the competitive equilibriumquantities of
commodity 1 respectively supplied by 1 and demanded by 2, while d21 = x21
and s22 = !2 x22 are the competitive equilibriumquantities of commodity
2 respectively demanded by 1 and supplied by 2.
Then, for any pair of di¤erentials dx1 and dx2 such that
dx2
dx1
=
x2
x1
, for
trader 1 one has:
v011(!1   x1)dx1 = v021(x2)dx2,
or
v011(!1   x1)
v021(x2)
=
dx2
dx1
. (2)
A similar condition holds for trader 2:
v012(x1)
v022(!2   x2)
=
dx2
dx1
. (3)
Hence, by substituting (1) into both (2) and (3), one gets:
v011(!1   x1)
v021(x2)
=
x2
x1
=
v012(x1)
v022(!2   x2)
, (4)
which are Jevonss "equations of exchange", representing his fundamen-
tal result in the "theory of exchange". The way in which such "equations"
are rst obtained and then interpreted by Jevons prompts the following
remarks.
In the rst place, it should be noted that, in deriving the "equations of
exchange", Jevons makes explicit use of equation (1), expressing the formal
version of the "law of indi¤erence". This has some important consequences
on the interpretation of Jevonss equilibrium concept: for, as we have seen,
the "law of indi¤erence" only holds at a specied time instant; but then
Jevonss equilibrium concept must be given an "instantaneous" interpreta-
tion as well. This means that the equilibrium allocation should be imagined
as instantaneously reached by the two traders, by means of one single "act
of exchange", taking place at one and the same competitive equilibrium
"ratio of exchange", and leading them directly from the initial endowment
to the nal equilibrium allocation.
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In the second place, it should be stressed that Jevonss argument is en-
tirely couched in terms of the competitive equilibriumvalues of the traded
quantities of the two commodities, x1 and x2, from which Jevons directly
derives the nite, competitive equilibrium"ratio of exchange", x

2
x1
, and
indirectly also the di¤erentialone, dx

2
dx1
, since the two "ratios" are assumed
equal by virtue of the "law of indi¤erence". This means, however, that
quantities or "ratios" di¤erent from the competitive equilibriumones are
nowhere mentioned or even alluded to by Jevons in the development of his
formal argument. But this is also the reason why Jevons nowhere introduces,
let alone discusses, an equation like
v011(!1   x1)
v021(x2)
=
dx2
dx1
=
v012(x1)
v022(!2   x2)
, (5)
dening Edgeworths "contract curve" (1881, p. 21), where x1 and x2
are the traded quantities of the two commodities that satisfy the functional
relationship implicitly dened by equation (5), while dx2dx1 is the di¤erential
"ratio of exchange" that, at every point along the "contract curve", equals
the common value of the tradersmarginal rates of substitution between
the two commodities prevailing at that point8. Given that Edgeworths
analysis in Mathematical Psychics starts precisely from Jevonss "theory of
exchange" in TPE (1881, pp. 20, 39, and App. V, pp. 104-16), the lack
of any hint in Jevonss "theory" to such equation or the associated "curve"
may appear surprising. But this is just another instance of the intrinsic
limits of Jevonss approach, to which we shall come back in Section 8 below.
Finally, it remains to discuss what relationship, if any, can be established
between Jevonss "theory of exchange", as expressed by his "equations of
exchange" (equations (4) above), and the so-called "laws of supply and de-
mand". Jevons himself takes a very sharp stance on this issue. For, in his
opinion,
our theory is perfectly consistent with the laws of supply and
demand; and if we had the functions of utility determined, it
would be possible to throw them into a form clearly expressing
the equivalence of supply and demand. (Jevons, 1970, p. 143)
The second part of this statement is relatively "cryptic" (Creedy 1992a,
p. 273): it probably means that, if the marginal utility functions could be
8 It should be noted that the di¤erential"ratio of exchange" appearing in equation (5),
dx2
dx1
, is a variable ratio, unlike the di¤erential"ratio of exchange" appearing in equations
(2) and (3), dx

2
dx1
, which is instead a xed number.
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analytically specied, what typically cannot be done, at least according to
Jevons, then for each commodity one could numerically compute the equi-
librium values of the quantities demanded and supplied, thereby conrming
the "equivalence of supply and demand". But, apart from this, should one
ask in which sense the alleged "perfect consistency" between "theory" and
"laws" ultimately reveals itself, Jevonss answer couldnt but appear quite
disappointing:
We may regard x1 as the quantity demanded on one side and
supplied on the other; similarly, x2 is the quantity supplied on
the one side and demanded on the other. Now, when we hold
the two equations to be simultaneously true, we assume that the
x1 and x2 of one equation equal those of the other. The laws of
supply and demand are thus a result of what seems to me the
true theory of value or exchange. (Jevons, 1970, pp. 143-4)
As a matter of fact, this sentence simply asserts that, at a competitive
equilibriumof a two-trader, two-commodity model, the equilibriumquan-
tity of either commodity demanded by either trader equals the equilibrium
quantity of the same commodity supplied by the other trader. Since in this
case the equilibrium condition is at least explicitly mentioned, Jevonss
statement does not in e¤ect boil down to J. S. Mills truism criticized by
Jevons himself (as recalled in footnote 2 above). Yet, the real content of
Jevonss statement is far too limited to justify his conclusion that "the laws
of supply and demand are [...] a result of [...] the true theory of value or ex-
change" or "the practical manifestation of the theory (1970, pp. 144, 148):
indeed, at the end of Jevonss discussion of his Edgeworth Box model, the
true meaning of the "laws of supply and demand" still remains in the dark.
Nor is Jevons able to shed some more light on this issue in his many
e¤orts aimed at extending his analysis of the Edgeworth Box economy in
various directions. In particular, as mentioned above, Jevons tries to gener-
alize his "equations of exchange" to economies with more than two traders
and/or more than two commodities. All his attempts in this direction rest
on the assumption that
[t]he exchanges in the most complicated case may [...] always
be decomposed into simple exchanges, and every exchange will
give rise to two equations su¢ cient to determine the quantities
involved. (Jevons, 1970, p. 154)
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Unfortunately, however, this assumption is unfounded: for Jevonss "the-
ory of exchange", which is molded on the requirements of the simple two-
trader, two-commodity economy, is insu¢ cient to cope with an economy
with a larger number of traders and/or commodities, unless it is reinforced
by the insertion of new concepts and assumptions. Hence, Jevonss reduc-
tionist strategy ends up in a failure: in spite of what he seems to suggest
(1970, p. 154), he is really unable to deal with traders who are not "cor-
nered"; moreover, when he tries to put forward a theory of multilateral
commodity exchanges, involving L > 2 commodities, he ends up with a set
of L(L 1)2 bilateral exchanges, each involving a pair of commodities and each
viewed as independent of the others, so that the L(L 1)2 "ratios of exchange",
obtained by applying the simple "equations of exchange" of Jevonss simple
two-commodity model, do not satisfy the Cournot-Walras arbitrage condi-
tions, to which we shall come back in Section 5 below This serious drawback
of Jevonss approach is explicitly recognized by Creedy (1992a, pp. 276-
7). In spite of this, however, Creedy inexplicably concludes that "Jevons
was in full control of his technical apparatus and provided a succinct and
substantially accurate treatment" (1992a, p. 282; see also 1992b, p. 133).
4 Jevonss theory of exchange: six unsettled ques-
tions
By examining Jevonss "theory of exchange" in the previous two Sections,
we have been able to identify a number of shortcomings characterizing it:
precisely, we have singled out three major ambiguities marring its conceptual
apparatus and three major gaps weakening its analytical structure. Concep-
tual ambiguities and analytical gaps are obviously related. All the same, it
is now convenient to list them separately, briey summarizing their features.
The rst ambiguity has to do with Jevonss peculiar concept of "trad-
ing bodies", that are alternatively viewed as either individual traders, or
representative agents, or "ctitious means". The second ambiguity arises
from Jevonss interpretation and use of the concepts of statics, dynamics
and equilibrium: after sharply distinguishing between statics and dynam-
ics, and contending that the exchange problem ought be tackled from a
purely statical point of view, Jevons is apparently willing to concede that
the study of the equilibration process is not inconsistent with statics; yet,
after recognizing that a truly dynamic analysis would require integrating
suitable di¤erential equations describing the trading process over time, he
ends up with endorsing a strictly "instantaneous" interpretation of the equi-
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librium concept. The third ambiguity is that surrounding the so-called "law
of indi¤erence": initially viewed as the outcome of a market equilibration
process taking place under stringent assumptions about the knowledge and
information of the traders, such "law" eventually boils down to an almost
trivial truism in its only relevant application.
Let us turn now to the gaps. The rst one is revealed by two related
facts: on the one hand, the price concept is almost entirely neglected by
Jevons; on the other, no serious demand-and-supply analysis is associated
to his "theory of exchange". The second gap has to do with the missing
equation of Edgeworths "contract curve": in e¤ect, no such equation is put
forward by Jevons, even if he apparently comes very close to identifying
its properties. Finally, the third gap is due to Jevonss inability to extend
his "theory of exchange" beyond the narrow boundaries of the two-trader,
two-commodity model.
All these shortcomings call for an explanation, a critical assessment, and
possible suggestions for improvement. Two economists contemporary with
Jevons, Fleeming Jenkin and Léon Walras, undertook this task during the
most productive period of Jevonss lifetime, as far as economic theory is
concerned, that is, during the period ranging from the publication of the
"Brief Account" in 1866 to the appearance of the second edition of TPE
in 1879; their contributions, moreover, were directly brought to Jevonss
attention by Jenkin and Walras, respectively, in private correspondence or
public debates. In the following we are interested in explaining, on the
one hand, why and how the two economists developed their critical views
of Jevonss "theory of exchange", and, on the other, why and how Jevons
reacted (or, better, did not react) to their critical remarks and suggestions9.
Even if Jenkin was the rst to enter the stage, it is preferable to start from
Walrass contribution: Walrass approach, in fact, is incomparably more
systematic and theoretically self-conscious than Jenkins; hence, even if it is
slightly posterior, it will prove instrumental in shedding light on the latters
earlier contribution as well.
9On the contrary, in this paper we shall not dwell on Edgeworths Mathematical Psy-
chics, even if that essay was explicitly conceived as a critical defence and generalization of
Jevonss approach. The fact is that Mathematical Psychics was published in 1881, that is,
just before Jevonss premature death in 1882; hence, the latters lack of reactions to Edge-
worths fundamental contribution is easily justied by Jevonss unfortunate lack of time.
Since this paper is focused on Jevonss interaction (or lack of interaction) with his critics,
we have chosen not to discuss Edgeworths work, apart from a few occasional remarks,
for in this case Jevonss silence requires no special explanation. The theoretical relation
between Edgeworth and Jevons, however, will be the subject of a companion paper.
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5 Walrass pure-exchange, two commodity model
Walrass critical remarks concerning Jevonss "theory of exchange" are ex-
plicitly put forward in a few passages that will be recalled in the next Section.
Yet, such scant explicit observations simply represent the distilled essence
of a huge mass of underlying reections, which only occasionally come to
the surface. As a matter of fact, the bulk of Walrass critique of Jevonss
approach is implicitly contained in the formers own theory of exchange,
made up of two related models (the two- and the multi-commodity model),
to which one has to turn in order to understand the real di¤erences between
the two economistspositions.
Walras develops his pure-exchange, two-commodity model in the rst
of his published theoretical writings, the mémoire "Principe dune théorie
mathématique de léchange" which appears in 1874, as well as in the rst
part of Section II of the rst edition of the Eléments, whose rst installment
is published in the same year10. Walrass two-commodity model is obviously
propaedeutical to his exchange model with an arbitrary nite number of
commodities, whose discussion immediately follows, in the Eléments, that of
the simpler two-commodity model11. Yet, in order to facilitate the intended
comparison between Walrass theory of exchange and Jevonss, which, as we
have seen, essentially boils down to a two-commodity model, we shall focus
attention on the two-commodity model in Walrass case as well. In the next
Section, however, in facing the issue of the generalizability of the theory, we
shall also devote a few remarks to Walrass multi-commodity model.
In his pure-exchange, two-commodity model Walras studies an exchange
10The rst edition of the Eléments is published in two installments, which respectively
appear in 1874 and 1877. Three further editions are published during Walrass lifetime:
the second edition appears in 1889, the third in 1996, and the fourth in 1900. A fth
posthumous edition, containing a few changes arranged by Walras himself before his death,
will be published in 1926. In this paper all references will be made to the comparative
variorum edition of the Eléments, published in 1988, collating the texts of all the previous
editions. When the text varies across editions and it is necessary or convenient to refer to
one or more specic editions, the number(s) of the edition(s) referred to will be specied
in bold, after the page number(s).
11 In the rst three editions of the Eléments the two-commodity model is put forward in
the rst part (approximately the rst half) of Section II, the second part of that Section
being devoted to the discussion of the exchange model with more than two commodities.
In the fourth and fth editions, instead, the old Section II is split into two Sections, the
new Sections II and III, respectively devoted to the exchange model with only two and
more than two commodities. The exchange model with an arbitrary nite number of
commodities is also separately discussed in Walrass second mémoire, called "Equations
de léchange", which is published in 1876.
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economy E2IW =
n 
R2+; ui () ; !i
I
i=1
o
, with I  2, satisfying a few specic
assumptions concerning the tradersendowments and utility functions. As
to the endowments, all the traders are assumed to be "cornered", that is, to
hold a positive quantity of one commodity only; specically, in the following
we shall assume !i = (!1i; 0), with !1i > 0, for i = 1; :::; I 0, with I 0  1,
and !i = (0; !2i), with !2i > 0, for i = I 0 + 1; :::; I, with I > I 0, so that
! = (!1; !2) = (
I0
i=1!1i;
I
i=I0+1!2i) 2 R2++. As to the utility functions,
each consumer i = 1; :::; I is supposed to be characterized by a cardinal,
additively separable utility function, satisfying the same restrictions on the
signs of the rst- and second-order pure partial derivatives as in Jevonss
model12. Under these assumptions, if the consumersnumber were I = 2,
then Walrass exchange economy E2IW would become indistinguishable from
Jevonss Edgeworth Box economy, E22J . In general, however, one must
suppose that, in Walrass model, I be greater than 2, while I 0 and I  I 0 are
both greater than 1.
Now let p = (p12; 1) 2 R2++ be the price system, expressed in terms of
commodity 2 taken as the numeraire. Since in the economy there are only
two commodities, one can only have one independent relative price, p12 =
1
p21
. Walras assumes the traders to behave competitively: precisely, Walrass
Perfect Competition Assumption implies that the traders take prices as
given and choose their optimal trade plans, called "dispositions à lenchère"
by Walras (1988, p. 83), in such a way as to maximize their respective
utility functions, under their respective Walrasian budget constraints. For
all p = (p12; 1), the optimization problem to be solved by trader i can be
formally written as:
MRSi21(x1i; x2i) =
v01i(x1i)
v02i(x2i)
= p12 (6)
pxi = p!i, (7)
12As a matter of fact, Walras typically assumes the marginal utility function of com-
modity l for consumer i to go to zero for xli < 1 (Walras, 1988, pp. 107-11). The
assumption that the marginal utility of each commodity be strictly positive and monoton-
ically decreasing over each consumers entire consumption set is made here with a view
to simplifying our discussion: in fact, it allows us to dodge all boundary problems and
to obtain demand and supply functions that are well-dened for all positive prices. This
assumption can anyhow be dispensed with, at the cost of complicating somewhat the
analysis.
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where equation (6) is Walrass "condition de satisfaction maxima" of
trader i and equation (7) is the Walrasian budget constraint of the same
trader, for i = 1; :::; I (Walras, 1988, pp. 111-7).
By solving this system, one obtains the individual demand and supply
functions for the two commodities for each trader, that is:
s1i(p12) = !1i   x1i(p12)
d2i(p12) = x2i(p12)
for i = 1; :::; I 0, and
d1i(p12) = x1i(p12)
s2i(p12) = !2i   x2i(p12)
for i = I 0 + 1; :::; I.
Then, by aggregating over the traders, we obtain the aggregate demand
and supply functions for both commodities, that is:
d1(p12) = 
I
i=I0+1d1i(p12) = 
I
i=I0+1x1i(p12),
s1(p12) = 
I0
i=1s1i(p12) = 
I0
i=1(!1i   x1i(p12)) = !1   I
0
i=1x1i(p12), and
d2(p12) = 
I0
i=1d2i(p12) = 
I0
i=1x2i(p12),
s2(p12) = 
I
i=I0+1s2i(p12) = 
I
i=I0+1(!2i   x2i(p12)) = !2   Ii=I0+1x2i(p12),
from which we can get the excess demand functions:
z1(p12) = d1(p12)  s1(p12) = Ii=I0+1x1i(p12)  !1 +I
0
i=1x1i(p12) =
= Ii=1x1i(p12)  !1 = x1(p12)  !1,
z2(p12) = d2(p12)  s2(p12) = I0i=1x2i(p12)  !2 +Ii=I0+1x2i(p12) =
= Ii=1x2i(p12)  !2 = x2(p12)  !2.
Finally, by setting the excess demand functions equal to zero, we obtain
the market clearing equations, one for each commodity:
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zl(p
W
12) = xl(p
W
12)  !l = 0, l = 1; 2. (8)
Yet, given WalrasLaw, that is, pz = p12z1(p12) + z2(p12)  0, 8p =
(p12; 1) 2 R++f1g, only one equation provides an independent equilibrium
condition. By solving either equation, therefore, we obtain the Walrasian
competitive equilibrium relative price, pW12 (Walras, 1988, pp. 136-7).
This "solution" is "analytique". But one can also restate it in geomet-
rical terms, that is, one can give it "la forme géométrique", by drawing
for each commodity the demand and supply curves and nding their in-
tersection. Anyhow, the "solution" thus determined, by means that can
indi¤erently be "analytique" or "géométrique" , still remains for Walras
(1988, p. 137) "la solution mathématique". Under the stated conditions, a
"solution" exists, even if it is not necessarily unique (Walras, 1988, p. 97).
Let us assume, for simplicity, that it is unique. Then one can ask how such
"solution" is concretely determined "sur le marché". According to Walras,
this empirical determination occurs as follows. One relative price p12 be-
ing "crié", the corresponding excess demand for commodity 1, z1(p12), is
determined "sans calcul, mais néanmoins conformément à la condition de
satisfaction maxima"; then p12 increases or decreases, according to whether
z1(p12) is greater or less than zero, and the process goes on until the equi-
librium price, pW12 , is eventually reached (Walras, 1988, pp. 137-8). This is
the rst instance of Walrass celebrated tâtonnement construct, a construct
that Walras will subsequently apply to all his equilibrium models with a view
to explaining how, in each case, "la solution mathématique" is empirically
attained "sur le marché".
6 Walrass critique of Jevonss theory of exchange
With his model of a pure-exchange two-commodity economy, Walras arrives
at results partially similar to those arrived at by Jevons with his "theory of
exchange" a few years before. This partial similarity, on the other hand, is
explicitly recognized by both of them - with many a qualication on Walrass
side, as will be seen - in the well-known exchange of correspondence taking
place in May 1874, shortly after the publication of Walrass rst mémoire13:
in particular, assuming the number of traders in Walrass model to be I = 2,
13This exchange, reproduced in the June 1874 issue of the Journal des Economistes,
and later in the various editions of Walrass Théorie mathématique de la richesse sociale
(1877, 1883), can now be found in Walras (1993, pp. 47-52).
25
not only does the economy analyzed by Walras turn out to be formally
identical with the Edgeworth Box economy examined by Jevons, but also
Walrass equations (6), (7) and (8), though reached through a di¤erent route,
boil down to Jevonss "equations of exchange" (4).
Yet, in spite of the similarities in some of the results eventually obtained,
not only does Walrass overall approach signicantly di¤er from Jevonss,
but the formers exchange models also prove to be a potentially much richer
theory than the latters "theory of exchange": in particular, starting from his
di¤erent methodological and analytical premises, Walras is able to confront
and answer some, though not all, of the questions left open by Jevonss
"theory of exchange", questions that have been summarized in Section 4
above. The roots of such divergence are partly identied by Walras himself
both in his 1874 open letter to Jevons (Walras, 1993, pp. 49-50) and, more
extensively, in the paragraph devoted to Jevonss "theory of exchange",
especially prepared for the second edition of the Eléments (1889), which
however appears when Jevons has been dead for seven years (Walras, 1988,
pp. 251-3, 2-5).
The fundamental di¤erence between the two approaches lies in the dif-
ferent interpretation of the perfect competition hypothesis: as we have seen,
in fact, the Perfect Competition Assumptionmeans for Walras, but not
for Jevons, that the traders make their optimizing choices by taking prices
as given parameters. But, as Walras himself does not fail to point out
(1988, p. 253, 2-5), this has momentous implications for the structure of
the two authorstheories: for, while in Walrass exchange models the "prix"
become the fundamental "inconnues du problème", in Jevonss "theory of
exchange" that role is played by the "quantitités échangées". By explicitly
introducing commodity prices into the picture, however, Walras is able to
extensively generalize the version of the "law of indi¤erence" actually em-
ployed by Jevons in constructing his "theory of exchange", a version that,
as explained above, is really nothing but a truism. What Walras actually
resorts to in building his exchange models is a much more general "law",
which might be called the Law of One Price, even if Walras never uses
the latter expression in his writings. Such Lawis already implicit in the
Perfect Competition Assumption, as it has been formulated above. Yet,
it might be useful to state it separately, in view of the crucial role it plays
in explaining the contrast between Walrass and Jevonss approaches: as
employed by Walras, the Law of One Price consists in the assumption
that, at any given instant, one and the same price system is simultaneously
announced to all traders, both at equilibrium and out of equilibrium.
When combined with the Perfect Competition Assumption, the Law
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of One Priceimplies that in Walrass exchange models the traders are sup-
posed to choose their trade plans, at the given prices, in all possible states
of the economy, that is, not only at equilibrium, but also out of equilibrium.
However, out of equilibrium not all the chosen trade plans can be actually
carried out. But this implies that some mentalistic concepts for which no
observable counterpart can be found, such as the trade plans chosen by at
least some traders when the economy is out of equilibrium, necessarily enter
Walrass exchange models. Nothing similar can instead be found in Jevonss
"theory of exchange": for, in this case, prices are never announced to traders,
nor disequilibrium trade plans are ever explicitly taken into account. Jevons
comes very close to allowing for this possible occurrence, when he discusses
the tradersutility maximizing choices at an arbitrarily given "ratio of ex-
change"; but, as explained in Section 3 above, he never really crosses the
line, for he stubbornly refuses to analyze the possible consequences of such
disequilibrium choices, leaving the whole discussion apparently unnished.
From this point of view, therefore, Walras (1993, pp. 49-50) is completely
right in asserting that Jevons does not derive his "équation déchange" from
an explicit "considération de satisfaction maximum", as embodied, in par-
ticular, in Walrass equation (6): to use that equation, in fact, would imply
taking prices as the fundamental "inconnues du problème", as well as ac-
cepting that mentalistic unobservable concepts, such as disequilibrium trade
plans, may enter the theoretical picture; but these are two steps that Jevons
is evidently unwilling to take. In Jevonss "equations of exchange", indeed,
the tradersutilities are maximized, under the constraint that the exchanges
take place at the competitive equilibrium"ratio of exchange"; but no price
and no trades other than the competitive equilibriumones, which are all
observable magnitudes, appear in Jevonss "equations", which, as we have
seen, are derived under the assumption that the economy already is "in an
equilibrium state"14.
14 In the wake of Edgeworths (1881, pp. 31, fn. 1, and 104-16) overly generous in-
terpretation of Jevonss concept of a "trading body" and, more generally, of his overall
"theory of exchange" (Black 1971, p. 267, note 35; Ja¤é 1972, p. 295), a few scholars
have recently maintained that, in deriving his "equations of exchange", Jevons explicitly
assumes the traders behavior to be of the "price-taking" type. In the light of this in-
terpretation, they have also suggested that the equilibrium concept employed in Jevonss
"theory of exchange" should be viewed as a standard "competitive equilibrium" concept
of the Walrasian sort: see, in particular, Creedy (1992a, p. 271; 1972b, pp. 119-21; 1998c,
pp. 6, 30-1) and Peart (1996, pp. 74, 81, and 257, endnotes 32 and 33). Yet, nowhere
in the rst thirteen Sections of Chapter IV of TPE, where Jevonss "theory of exchange"
is formally stated and illustrated, can one nd any assumption or statement concerning
the "price-taking" or "competitive" behavior of traders in the Walrasian sense or, for that
27
Moreover, by assuming the Law of One Priceand making the Perfect
Competition Assumption, Walras can free himself from the restrictions on
the number of traders that Jevons is instead forced to respect in developing
his "theory of exchange": as a matter of fact, from the very beginning Wal-
rass pure-exchange, two-commodity model, unlike Jevonss, is supposed to
describe the functioning of an economy with any nite number of traders.
This is possible in Walrass case for, in view of the Law of One Priceand
the Perfect Competition Assumption, Walras can immediately aggregate
the tradersoptimal trade plans, irrespective of their number, and can con-
sequently dene the aggregate demand and supply functions for each com-
modity without a hitch. As Walras rightly points out (1993, p. 50), such
functions cannot instead be obtained in Jevonss case, due to the latters in-
ability to take prices as the "inconnues du problème" and his related refusal
to deal with unobservables. Moreover, and for the same reasons, there is no
need, in Walrass case, to have recourse to Jevonss ambiguous concept of a
"trading body", nor to use any other "ctitious mean", in order to nd an
indirect way to describe the aggregate behavior of a group of traders: Jevons
is compelled to resort to such indirect devices since, unlike Walras, he starts
from a theory that, from a rigorous and formal point of view, only applies to
two individual traders, as Walras does not fail to emphasize (1988, p. 253,
2-5).
Another implication of Walrass modelling choices, especially of his adop-
tion of the two assumptions on which we have dwelled above, is the ease with
which he can extend his two-commodity model with "cornered" traders to
a multi-commodity model with traders characterized by arbitrary endow-
ments: to this end, Walras needs only supplement his original assumptions
with a "theory of arbitrage", as already developed in a di¤erent context
by Cournot (1838, Chapter III), from whom Walras borrows the idea and
matter, in the Edgeworthian sense (that is, as the limiting behavior of a small trader in
an unboundedly large economy). It is only in Section fourteen, called "Problems in the
Theory of Exchange", that Jevons discusses "the position of an individual consumer with
regard to the aggregate trade of a large community", assuming that such small trader
behaves as a "price-taker" "since he must buy at the current prices, which he cannot in
any appreciable degree e¤ect". At this stage of the argument, however, Jevonss "equa-
tions of exchange" have already been derived in the preceding Sections under altogether
di¤erent assumptions about the two "trading bodies", neither one of which has been sup-
posed to be "small" with respect to the other, and are not only taken for granted, but
also e¤ectively employed to nd out the quantity traded by the small consumer concerned,
under the assumption that the equilibrium "ratio of exchange" be "an approximately xed
ratio", rather than the unknown variable to be determined by solving the "equations of
exchange", as it had been the case in the previous Sections (Jevons 1970, pp. 150-1).
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the associated solution (Walras, 1988, pp. 161-73, 1 and 2-5). But Walras
can exploit Cournots intuition, building upon it a truly general equilibrium
model of a multi-commodity exchange economy with traders characterized
by arbitrary endowments, only because he, unlike Jevons, chooses to take
prices as the fundamental "inconnues du problème": failing this, no gener-
alized budget constraint for "non-cornered" traders can be dened and no
consistency requirement among triples of prices, based on indirect exchanges
among traders acting in more than two markets, can really be satised.
Finally, with his theory of the tâtonnement, Walras is apparently able
to provide an answer to the issue of equilibrium attainment, an issue that,
as explained in Section 2 above, had been left by Jevons in a state of am-
biguity and confusion. Yet Walrass approach, in spite of his rm belief
in the validity of the suggested solution, is far from unobjectionable. As a
matter of fact, in 1874, at the time when Walras rst formalizes his analysis
of the process of adjustment towards equilibrium in his exchange models,
he is probably convinced that the dynamics of the tâtonnement process is
compatible with observable disequilibrium behavior, even if he is unable to
put forward any formal theory of such behavior15. Yet, after the appear-
ance of Bertrands critical review of Walrass Théorie mathématique de la
richesse sociale (1883), Walras is forced to recognize that any sort of ob-
servable out-of-equilibrium trading would necessarily entail some change in
the data of the theory, hence in the equilibrium eventually reached by the
equilibration process; therefore, in order to avoid this outcome, that he had
been anxious to rule out from the beginning (1988, p. 146), Walras is led to
explicitly introduce a No-Trade-Out-Of-Equilibrium Assumption, turning
the tâtonnement process in the exchange models into a purely virtual process
in logicaltime, over which nothing observable is allowed to take place16.
15As far as the exchange models are concerned, Walrass belief that the tâtonnement
construct is not inconsistent with the traders carrying out actual observable trades when
markets are out of equilibrium can only be indirectly inferred from the introductory ex-
amples of the out-of-equilibrium working of specic markets (the market for corn and
the market for consols) he develops for illustration purposes in his rst mémoire (Walras,
1993, pp. 31-2) and the rst edition of the Eléments (Walras, 1988, pp. 71-2, 1), respec-
tively. As far as the production models are concerned, however, it is absolutely certain
that, at the time of writing the rst edition of the Eléments and well beyond it, Walras
is convinced that the dynamics of the tâtonnement process entails observable disequilib-
rium behavior. Donzelli (2007) discusses in detail how Walrass ideas on the nature of the
tâtonnement construct and its relationship with equilibrium and disequilibrium analysis
evolve over the various editions of the Eléments and related writings appearing in the last
quarter of the Nineteenth century (precisely from 1874 to 1900).
16See Walras (1885, p. 312, fn. 1), (1988, pp. 71-2, 2-5); see also the mémoire attached
to a letter sent by Walras to Pareto, as reproduced in Ja¤é (1965, Vol. II, p. 630). In
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So, in the end, not di¤erently from Jevonss "state of equilibrium", also
Walrass equilibrium state must be supposed to be instantaneously arrived
at, even if in the latter case the equilibrium attainment is apparently ex-
plained by means of a durationless process, i.e., a process which consumes
no amount of realtime to carry its e¤ects through.
7 Jenkin vs. Jevons on the theory of exchange
It is somewhat surprising that Jevons should neither emphasize the patent
di¤erences between his approach and Walrass, nor apparently try to con-
trast Walrass critical remarks. As a matter of fact, immediately after be-
coming acquainted with Walrass pure-exchange two-commodity model, as
put forward in Walrass rst mémoire, Jevons politely reacts by sending a
letter to Walras where he stresses the similarities between the two theories
(Walras 1993, pp. 47-9). Then, soon after being informed by Walras himself
that, in the latters opinion, barring one specic "point de contact", their re-
spective theories might prove to be "quelque peu divergentes" (Walras 1993,
pp. 47-9), Jevons, in writing a paper on "The Progress of the Mathematical
Theory of Political Economy", restates his own version of the "theory of
exchange" as if it were fully representative of Walrass own version as well
(Jevons, 1874, pp. 75-85)17.
Even more startling, however, are Jevonss remarks about the so-called
"laws of supply and demand", remarks that can be found in the same 1874
paper that has just been mentioned. In this regard, Jevons asserts that
"the laws of supply and demand [...] are easily deduced from the theory of
exchange", where by "theory of exchange" he means precisely the theory de-
veloped "in the work of M. Walras, or in my Theory of Political Economy";
in Jevonss opinion, such deduction is particularly easy, since the "laws of
supply and demand" are "the principal inferences" that can be derived from
the "theory of exchange" (Jevons, 1874, pp. 83-4). But, as we have seen in
the fourth edition of the Eléments, appearing in 1900, Walras, by eventually adopting the
so-called "hypothèse des bons", is able to generalize the No-Trade-Out-Of-Equilibrium
Assumptionto all sorts of models and tâtonnement processes, including those involving
production activities (Walras, 1988, pp. 309, 377, 447, 4-5).
17Jevonss harmonious view of the relationship between his own theory and Walrass
will be endorsed by a number of later commentators: see, e.g., Black (1962, p. 209) or
Ekelund and Shieh (1989, pp. 7-9) who, after devoting two pages to an accurate discussion
of Walrass critique of Jevonss approach, quite unexplicably conclude that "Walras clearly
knew from the outset that Jevonss approach to exchange was practically identical to his
own".
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the previous Sections, while in Walrass works the "laws of supply and de-
mand" are extensively discussed in a way that is quite close to contemporary
standards, nothing similar can instead be found in Jevonss writings. On the
other hand, this missing piece in Jevonss "theory of exchange" had already
been pointed out by Walras himself when, in commenting upon Jevonss rst
paper in theoretical economics (the "Brief Account", published in 1866), he
had written:
Je ne vois pas non plus que vous [...] fondiez [léquation déchange]
sur la considération de satisfaction maximum, qui est pourtant
si simple et si claire. Je ne vois pas non plus que vous en tiriez
léquation de la demand e¤ective en fonction du prix, qui sen
déduit si aisément, et qui est si essentielle à la solution du prob-
lème de la détermination des prix déquilibre. (Walras, 1993, p.
50)
Finally, it is also surprising that Jevons should not take into account
Walrass objections and implicit suggestions in preparing the second edition
of TPE (1879). In the second edition, in e¤ect, one can nd a number
of changes and additions with respect to the rst one, but none of them
is apparently related to Walrass observations: Jevonss revisions only con-
cern those parts of the book with which he had been dissatised from the
beginning or against which some critical remarks had been made by some
reviewers of the rst edition18.
Of course, one can provide an easy explanation for Jevonss lack of reac-
tions to the stimuli proceeding from Walras. In fact, it was only in 1874 that
Walras eventually entered the theoretical debate with the publication of his
rst mémoire on the theory of exchange; hence, it was only since that date
that Walrass novel approach could possibly start producing some e¤ects
on Jevonss view of the exchange problem. By that date, however, Jevons
had been working for more than a decade at the construction of his "theory
of exchange"; hence, one may plausibly conjecture that in the mid-1870s it
18Specically, in the second edition of TPE, the Section "Analogy to the Theory of the
Lever" (Jevons, 1970, pp. 144-7) is appended to the central theoretical Section "Symbolic
Statement of the Theory", already present in the rst edition (1871, pp. 99-103), in order
to rebut the objections concerning the so-called "problem of integration" raised, among
others, by two reviewers of the rst edition of TPE : the author of the anonymous review
published in November 1871 on the Saturday Review, who can probably be identied as the
mathematician G.W. Hemming of St. Johns College, Cambridge, and Alfred Marshall,
whose chilly review of TPE had been published on The Academy in April 1872 (see Black,
1981, pp. 141-6 and 152-7).
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was too late for Jevons to positively respond to a sudden external impulse,
let alone to accept a major change in his entrenched habits of thought and
direction of research. Yet, even if this sort of explanation has some appeal,
it is not entirely convincing: for, six years before Walrass fatal appear-
ance on the scene, Jevons had already been exposed to some of the new
ideas that Walras would have forcefully brought to his attention in 1874;
in particular, Jevons had already been informed not only on how individ-
ual demand and supply functions can be obtained from the solution of the
tradersutility maximization problems, but also on how such functions can
be concretely employed to solve the equilibrium determination problem in
Jevonss Edgeworth Box model. As all interested scholars can easily check
since the publication of Jevonss 1863-1872 correspondence (Black, 1977),
all the events just summarized had occurred in 1868, i.e., well before the
date (1870) to which the rst draft of TPE can be traced back, thanks to
Fleeming Jenkin, an engineer-economist particularly active in the economic
debates raging in Great Britain in the late 1860s and early 1870s19, who had
an exchange of correspondence with Jevons precisely in that year.
As will be seen, Jenkins remarkable contribution essentially consists in
an almost complete theory of both the derivation of the tradersindividual
demand and supply curves from their marginal utility curves, and the graph-
ical determination of a competitive equilibrium along quasi-Walrasian lines.
Jenkins contribution is contained in a short series of two or three letters he
sent to Jevons at the beginning of March 1868, in reply to letters by the lat-
ter that have unfortunately not been retraced: Jenkins rst letter is dated
March 4, 1868, while the other one is (or the other two are) dated March
11, 186820. Even if Jevonss letters are lost, it is apparent from Jenkins
discussion that his correspondents arguments must have been closely simi-
lar to, if not identical with, those which Jevons would have later developed
in TPE : in particular, it is clear that the only kind of diagram used by
Jevons in his letters must have been the same as that drawn in Fig. 5 of
TPE (Jevons, 1970, p. 140), upon which we dwelled in Section 3 above21.
19See, in particular, Jenkin (1868), (1870), and (1871), later reprinted in Jenkin (1931).
On Jenkins life and fortune see Brownlie and Prichard (1963).
20From the materials published in Black (1977, pp. 166-78), it is unclear whether the
two documents dated March 11 are really distinct letters or, what is more likely, just two
parts of one and the same letter, written at di¤erent times of the same day and mailed
together in the same envelope.
21As will be recalled, that diagram is drawn by Jevons (1970, pp. 140-1) under the
assumption that "the ratio of exchange [between the two commodities] be that of unit for
unit, or 1 to 1". As we shall see, Jenkin develops in his letters a much more sophisticated
graphical apparatus, under the assumption of a variable "ratio of exchange". Yet he starts
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At the same time, it is also apparent that not a single piece of the notable
demand-and-supply apparatus put forward by Jenkin in his correspondence
nds its way into Jevonss later writings, including the two editions of TPE
published during Jevonss lifetime.
Thirty years after the publication of the Jenkin-Jevons correspondence,
the reasons why Jevons should not have taken advantage, in writing TPE,
of the suggestions freely put at his disposal by Jenkin are still somewhat
mysterious22. In the case of Jenkin, the reasons for Jevonss neglect of his
correspondents enlightening contribution cannot be the same as in the case
of Walras: for, even if Jevons had already arrived at a reasonably well-
dened general conception of his "theory of exchange" in the early 1860s,
in 1868 he was certainly much more open-minded than he would have been
six years later, particularly because in 1868 TPE had yet to be written,
while in 1874 it was a published work with a reasonably well-established
reputation. Moreover, the attention paid by Jevons to Jenkins contributions
was certainly very high, as is conrmed by Jevons himself when he reveals
that it was "partly in consequence" of the publication of Jenkins 1870 paper
on "The Graphic Representation of the Laws of Supply and Demand" that
he "was led to write and publish the Theory in 1871" (Black, 1977, p. 166).
Why then not a single one of the revolutionary ideas put forward by Jenkin
in 1868 percolates through Jevonss mind, eventually surfacing in the rst
edition of TPE? Before answering this question, it is necessary to examine in
greater detail Jenkins ideas, as sketched in his correspondence with Jevons.
In the rst letter, in discussing a standard two-trader, two-commodity
model, Jenkin develops a graphical apparatus allowing him to determine
the quantities of both commodities demanded or supplied by either trader,
under the assumption of a given "ratio of exchange", which, in the apparent
wake of Jevons, is taken equal to 1 "only [...] to facilitate the graphical
expression". The two traders, respectively labelled "Jones" and "Brown",
are cornered in the two commodities: Jones (resp., Brown) holds the overall
endowment of "silk" (resp., "cotton"). Jenkin then proceeds as follows: rst,
precisely from Jevonss simplied diagram, referring to the latters assumption of a "1 to
1 exchange ratio" as "a device [...] only required to facilitate the graphical expression"
(Black, 1977, p. 171).
22After the appearance of Blacks editorial comments (1977a, especially pp. 166-8),
only few other scholars have come back to the Jevons-Jenkin exchange: see, in particular,
White (1989, pp. 443-8), Creedy (1992a, p. 271; 1992b, pp. 119-20; 1998c, p. 31), and
Peart (1996, p. 257, endnote 32), none of whom, however, seem to provide a conclusive
reading of the debate. Bostaph and Shieh (1987, pp. 122-4) discuss the relationship
between Jevonss and Jenkins respective approaches to demand-and-supply analysis, but
wholly disregard the 1868 exchange.
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for each trader, the marginal utility curve of one commodity is superposed
on the reversed marginal utility curve of the other, the quantities of both
commodities being therefore measured along the same horizontal axis, but
in opposite directions; secondly, the diagram representing the two marginal
utility curves of one trader is rotated by 180 on the commodity axis and
then placed side by side with the other traders diagram, in such a way that
the commodity axes coincide. In the resulting diagram, reproduced as Fig.
2 below, "Jones" is the top trader, while "Brown" is the bottom one; "silk"
is measured from left to right, while "cotton" is measured from right to left;
"x" and "y" (resp., "x1" and "y1") are the quantities of "cotton" and "silk"
that "Jones" (resp., "Brown") are willing to exchange: since the "ratio of
exchange" is provisionally taken equal to 1, in the diagram one necessarily
has x = y and x1 = y1 (Black, 1977, pp. 170-1). By means of this device,
eight variables (namely, the quantities and the marginal utilities of the two
commodities for either trader) can be simultaneously represented on the
same plane. Under the assumption of cardinal utility, Jenkins apparatus
provides the same information, though in a more cumbersome way, as would
be provided by an Edgeworth Box apparatus describing the same economy.
Fig. 2
Now, for Jenkin it is an easy task to show that, given an arbitrary
"ratio of exchange", the two tradersdemands and supplies are generally not
compatible. In case they are not, Jenkin assumes, as a matter of course, that
an exchange will take place all the same: the quantities actually traded are
determined in conformity with the rule currently known as "the short-side
rule". Specically, in the above diagram it turns out that x = y < x1 = y1;
hence, the quantities traded would be those corresponding to Joness desires,
i.e., x and y, while Brown, who happens to nd himself on the long side,
would be rationed. The shaded areas in the diagram represent the increases
in the traderstotal utilities ensuing from their trading the specied amounts
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of the two commodities at the given "ratio of exchange": while Joness utility
would be maximized by such a trade (under the constraint of a xed "ratio of
exchange" equal to 1), Browns wouldnt. Now, for Jenkin, the real problem
is to determine the "ratio" at which the traders are "both perfectly satised
& would exchange neither more nor less"; but, he concludes, "I see in this
theory no means of determining [that] ratio [...]" (Black, 1977, pp. 172).
Jenkins rst letter ends more or less with this negative conclusion. Yet,
in the following letter(s), Jenkin makes considerable progress towards solving
the problem he himself has raised, even if, as we shall see, he is the rst not
to be satised with the suggested solution. As a matter of fact, in the second
letter Jenkin is able to extend his graphical apparatus in such a way as to
take explicitly into account the e¤ects of changes in the "ratio of exchange"
between the two commodities, initially taken as xed. It should be noted
that, while the notation and the diagrams employed in the rst letter are
similar or identical to the notation and diagram (Fig. 5 of TPE ) used by
Jevons in TPE, none of the developments we are now discussing can be
found in those parts of TPE where Jevons deals with the same subject.
To get his result, Jenkin proceeds as follows. First, one of the two com-
modities, the same for both traders, is tacitly taken as the numeraire of the
economy: the priceof this commodity is set equal to 1, while the "ratio
of exchange" becomes the relative priceof the other (it should be noted
that Jenkin, like Jevons, never uses the terms priceor relative pricein his
discussion). Secondly, for each trader Jenkin tacitly divides the marginal
utility functions of the two commodities by their respective prices, thereby
obtaining a pair of weighted marginal utilityfunctions, whose graphs are
then plotted (Black, 1977, p. 173)23. Finally, by progressively changing the
"ratio of exchange" between the two commodities, i.e., the relative priceof
one commodity in terms of the other taken as the numeraire, each traders
weighted marginal utilitycurves are made to move, so that their intersec-
tion changes, describing for each trader a sequence of quantities demanded
and supplied of the two commodities. The process goes on until a pair of con-
sistent intersection points, one for each trader, is graphically discovered and
a competitive equilibrium determined (Black, 1977, pp. 176, 178). Jenkins
relevant diagrams are reproduced below as Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, respectively24.
23By drawing such "weighted marginal utility curves", Jenkin anticipates by more than
two decades a graphical technique that will be independently developed by Walras in 1890
(see Walras 1988, Appendice I, par. I, pp. 692-9, 3-5).
24 It should be noted that Jenkin makes a slip in drawing the diagram reproduced as
Fig. 3: for, while asserting that the equilibrium rate of exchange is the "rate numbered
2" in his diagram, he keeps to this statement only as far as the top trader ("Jones") is
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Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Under the assumption of cardinal utility functions, Jenkins graphical
method of solution is analogous to, though more awkward than, the method
that can be used in an Edgeworth Box in order to graphically determine the
competitive equilibrium allocation: such method, as is well-known, consists
in rotating the budget line around the endowment point until a common
tangency point with a pair of indi¤erence curves, one for each trader, is
arrived at.
On top of this, however, another method of solution is put forward by
Jenkin. Instead of plotting on a plane a sequence of weighted marginal
utilitycurves, Jenkin adopts a three-dimensional representation, which can
be obtained by the previous one by adding a third orthogonal axis on which
concerned; for the bottom trader ("Brown"), instead, the equilibrium rate is mistakenly
numbered 3. The equilibrium "rate" is identied by the consistency of the traderstrade
plans, i.e., by the fact that x = x1.
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to represent the changing values of the relative price. Then, for each trader,
two solids can be obtained, each bounded above by the surface described
by the moving weighted marginal utilitycurves. Now, as can be seen from
the diagram reproduced below as Fig. 5, "the variation in the quantity [of
cotton] Jones might like to exchange might be represented by the horizontal
projection of the curve caused by the intersection of two solids" (Black,1977,
p. 174).
Fig. 5
Proceeding in this way, Jenkin is able to derive the demand and supply
curves for either trader, which he calls the "exchange curves". Then he goes
on as follows:
Calling mb Jones [sic] exchange curve [for one commodity] de-
termined as above, & op Browns [sic] exchange curve [for the
same commodity], putting these two curves together as sketched
we shall nd the rate xed by your [i.e., Jevonss] equations.
(Black, 1977, p. 175)
The relevant diagrams are reproduced below as Fig. 6 and Fig. 7.
Fig. 6
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Fig. 7
8 Jenkin, Jevons andWalras on demand-and-supply
analysis
Since it is practically certain that such apparatus was unknown to Jevons
before his correspondence with Jenkin in 186825, Jenkin might have played
with respect to Jevons a role similar to that played by Paul Piccard with
respect to Walras26. As is well-known, in a note written at Walrass request,
25As already mentioned in the Introduction, Jevons claimed priority with respect to
Jenkin in the use of "intersecting curves to illustrate the determination of the market price"
in both handwritten notes and private correspondence: beyond Jevons (1911, p. 333), see
also Black (1977b, pp. 5-6). Moreover, "in an undated fragment in Jevonss handwriting",
explicitlt referring to the 1868 "correspondence" with Jenkin, Jevons maintains that "in
the course of [that exchange] curves were used in illustration by both parties (Black,
1977a, p. 166). Yet, as already suggested by Keynes (1912, p. 80), no diagram can be
found in Jevonss 1866 "Brief account". In all the editions of TPE the only diagram with
"intersecting curves" is Fig. 5 (reproduced as Fig. 1 above), which however deals with the
marginal utility curves of the same trader for two commodities and can hardly be viewed
as an instance of the use of demand-and-supply analysis for the "determination of market
price" (Black 1977c, p. X). Lastly, as to Harold Ryletts Lecture Notes, one can indeed
nd two diagrams with negatively sloped curves, which can be interpreted as "long-run
empirical market demand curves" for "sugar" and "corn", respectively, obtained under
the assumption of unchanging conditions on the demand side of the market and variable
supply conditions (Bostaph and Shieh 1987). Yet, as Keynes (1936, p. 138, fn. 2) aptly
points out, such market demand curves are not derived from individual curves based on
the marginal principle. Hence, Jevonss claims to priority with respect to Jenkin about
the use of demand and supply curves in the determination of exchange equilibrium appear
to be basically unsubstantiated.
26Ekelund and Shieh (1989, p. 29) seem occasionally to endorse the idea that "Jevonss
approach resembles Piccards"; see also Creedy (1992a, p. 283; 1992b, p. 140; 1998a,
p. 338; 1998c, p. 32). Yet, as Ekelund and Shieh themselves are led to recognize in
the immediately following lines, such idea is ill-founded, for Piccard (and later Walras),
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presumably in October 1872, Paul Piccard, then professor of mechanics and
a colleague of Walrass at the Académie de Lausanne, solves the problem
of analytically deriving demand and supply functions from marginal util-
ity functions in a two-commodity context, a problem that Walras had been
unable to solve up to that time27. From the point of view of the formal-
ism employed, Jenkins contribution is less advanced and less precise than
Piccards: Jenkins solution, in fact, is purely geometrical, and moreover rel-
atively clumsy, while Piccards is analytical and neat; furthermore, Jenkins
letters, evidently written in a hurry, are full of slips and mistakes, which
however are not missing even in the much more pondered note by Piccard.
On the other hand, the scope of Jenkins discussion is wider than Piccards,
since the former provides a full graphical solution of the equilibrium prob-
lem in the two-trader case, while Piccard does not provide any analytical
solution of the equilibrium problem in the exchange model with an arbitrary
nite number of traders, probably because not required to do so by Walras,
who had already been able to solve the problem by himself (starting, how-
ever, from empirically given aggregate demand and supply functions without
any explicit microfoundation). Somewhat paradoxically, however, the wider
scope of Jenkins note does not turn to Jevonss advantage.
As a matter of fact, while Walras is eager to grasp the manna falling from
Piccards heaven, as well as to exploit the new conceptual and analytical
tools made available by his colleague in order to erect upon them his whole
theoretical system, Jevons, instead, is not prepared to accept Jenkins gift,
also because that gift, unlike Piccards, is partly poisonous. The fact is that
neither Jenkin, nor, to an even greater degree, Jevons himself are willing
to bear the logical consequences of adopting an approach to the solution
of the equilibrium determination problem in a pure-exchange economy that
will later come to be known as the Walrasian demand-and-supply, or excess-
demand, approach. As for Jenkin, his reluctance to follow through the logic
of the Walrasian approach can be inferred both from what he does explicitly
write in his 1868 correspondence with Jevons, and from what he chooses to
omit in his later writings on demand-and-supply analysis and especially in
his celebrated 1870 paper on "The Graphical Representation of the Laws
unlike Jevons, did "use the ratio of prices instead of the ratio of quantities" in his analysis;
moreover Jevons, unlike Piccard (and Walras), "did not clearly perceive that the budget
constraint also plays a very important role in the theory of exchange". So, one can ask:
Where does the similarity stand?
27Piccards note is reproduced both in Ja¤é (1965, Vol. I, pp. 308-311) and in Walras
(1993, pp. 693-5). On Piccards role in the development of Walrass Eléments, see Ja¤é
(1977).
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of Supply and Demand", where he makes essentially no reference to that
individual demand-and-supply apparatus, based on the maximizing behavior
of competitive traders, that he himself had tentatively developed in 1868. As
for Jevons, his unwillingness to pay the costs implicit in adopting a demand-
and-supply analysis of the Walrasian type is chiey, but not exclusively,
revealed by his bewildering omissions in TPE.
Let us consider Jenkins position rst. Immediately after drawing a
demand-and-supply equilibrium diagram relative to the non-numeraire com-
modity, similar to the one reproduced in Fig. 7 above, Jenkin makes the
following remark:
If ml be Jones [sic] exchange curve & np Browns [sic] exchange
curve their intersection determines the rate of exchange at which
each would be satised to exchange exactly the same quantity,
but there is no motive operating on their minds to induce them
to agree on this rate. (Black, 1977, p. 177)
Now, this passage may appear to raise the very same indeterminacy
issue as will be raised a few years later by Edgeworth in his Mathematical
Psychics (1881, pp. 20, 29-30, 109), with reference to the so-called "simple
contract" problem faced by an "isolated couple" of traders. But this is really
not so, for Jenkins curves are obtained under the apparent assumption
that the two traders make their trade choices as if they were competitive
utility maximizers, who adjust quantities to given "rates of exchanges",
while Edgeworths "two isolated bargainers" are denitely not supposed to
take prices as given nor to trade at a constant "rate of exchange" until an
equilibrium is eventually reached (Edgeworth, 1981, pp. 31, 40, 42, 47-8,
109).
Now, when in a pure-exchange, two-commodity model the traders are
assumed to behave as competitive utility maximizers, three consequences
necessarily follow: 1) at a given relative price(or "ratio of exchange", or
"rate of exchange"), the traders choose unobservable trade plans, typically
unexecutable, which can be turned into observable, executable trades only
at equilibrium; 2) the adjustment process towards equilibrium is brought
about by progressively changing the relative price in conformity to the
usual price adjustment rule, according to which the change in the relative
priceis a sign-preserving function of the aggregate excess-demand for the
corresponding commodity; 3) this change cannot itself be the product of
the individual traders choices, but can only be e¤ected by an objective
mechanism, pursuing a superindividual aim. The rules of the competitive
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game, therefore, seem to call for a twofold disconnection: the rst rule
requires that, out of equilibrium, the tradersunobservable plans of action
be distinguished from their observable actions; the second and third rule
entail that the mechanism in charge of the equilibration process be driven
by a law of motion which is independent of the individualsrationality and
preferences.
Walras, after some uncertainties and oscillations, eventually accepts the
rules of the competitive game. As to the second one, it is the essence of the
Walrasian tâtonnement construct that the adjustment towards equilibrium
be carried out by the "mécanisme de la concurrence sur le marché", which is
conceived as an objective device, independent of the traderswill and desires
(Walras, 1988, p. 93). As to the rst rule, however, as recalled in Section 6
above, Walras yields to the requirements of the competitive discipline only
towards the end of his active scientic life, after cultivating for a long time
the dream that some sort of observable disequilibrium behavior can not only
be allowed for, but also be accounted for by the theory.
Now, if Walras, the very founder of the general equilibrium approach,
wavers for such a long time about the rst rule, it is certainly not surprising
that Jenkin, whose theoretical awareness is incomparably inferior to Wal-
rass, should never accept it. As a matter of fact, Jenkins stance is peculiar:
for he accepts the competitive idea that the traders make their choices by
taking the relative priceas a xed parameter, but he does not accept the
consequent requirement that the tradersplans be distinguished from their
actual trades and, in particular, that no trades be carried out at disequilib-
rium prices. On the contrary, according to Jenkin, plans must always be
carried out, even out of equilibrium. But then he is forced to concoct an ex-
planation for disequilibrium behavior; and this, in turn, makes his adoption
of the "short-side rule" intelligible.
As to the adjustment process, Jenkin never accepts the idea that there
exists an objective mechanism, moreover of a virtual type, which is at work
in the economy: for him, the driving force of the adjustment process must
lie in the subjective motivations of the individual members of the economy.
But then he is caught in the following dilemma: on the one hand, given his
quasi-competitive premises, the relative price becomes the most natural
candidate for playing the role of the state variable in any plausible equili-
bration process; on the other, since he wants the adjustment process to be
the outcome of the individualsmotivated choices, he needs to nd a set
of concurrent motivations leading the traders to jointly change the relative
pricein a denite direction. But, of course, no such set of concurrent moti-
vations can possibly exist: for, in an Edgeworth Box economy with cornered
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traders, making their choices as if they were competitive utility maximizers,
no change in the relative pricecan be to the advantage of both traders28.
This negative conclusion is forcefully stressed by Jenkin in the following sen-
tence, which refers to the same demand-and-supply equilibrium diagram as
reproduced in Fig. 7 above:
You appear to me to assume that the ratio of exchange would
be that xed by the intersection of the curves ml and np, but
in order that this should be true it would be necessary that the
aggregate utilities to each party should increase up to that point
which is not true. (Black, 1977, p. 177; see also p. 178)
According to Jenkin, therefore, such a competitive equilibrium"rate
of exchange" can well be identied, but "it is not the true rate which will
obtain in any market except accidentally", since there is "no motive power
tending to change" the "rate" in the appropriate direction. (Black, 1977,
pp. 177-8).
In the light of this perplexing result, it is certainly not accidental that al-
most nothing of Jenkins derivation of individual demand and supply curves
from utiliy maximization should survive in his 1870 paper on " The Geo-
metrical Representation of the Laws of Supply and Demand". In Jenkins
1870 paper, in fact, only aggregate demand and supply curves are discussed
in any detail; no reference is made to individual demand or supply curves,
let alone to their possible microfoundation in the tradersutility maximiza-
tion decisions, the only vague allusion to the arguments put forward in the
1868 exchange with Jevons being an occasional hint to the short-side rule
(Jenkin, 1870, p. 78).
Given Jenkins negative conclusions about the possibility of buttressing
Jevonss competitive equilibriumtheory, i.e., the latters "exchange equa-
tions", with a demand-and-supply analysis of the Walrasian type, it is after
all not surprising that Jevons should not feel encouraged to exploit to his
advantage the tools provided by his correspondent. But the reasons under-
lying Jevonss refusal to adopt a Walrasian or quasi-Walrasian approach to
equilibrium determination in the theory of exchange are probably even more
basic than those leading Jenkin to doubt of the usefulness of that approach.
For Jevons, in fact, the very distinction between a trade plan and an "act
of trade", a distinction that is required by the Walrasian type of demand-
and-supply analysis, is unconceivable: all trades one can legitimately speak
of are the observable outcomes of bilateral bargains involving two traders at
28This point is lucidly emphasized by Edgeworth (1881, p. 116).
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a time; there is no such thing as a trade plan, disconnected from an "act of
trade", which can in principle be carried out; in short, no counterfactuals
are allowed for in the "theory of exchange"29.
Trading is conceived by Jevons as a physical activity, comparable to the
actions, motions, and processes discussed by mechanics. Any trade is viewed
as bringing about a joint change in the commodity holdings of the traders
involved; such change is comparable to the joint displacement of two mater-
ial points constrained to move together in ordinary space30. This mechanical
analogy so strongly a¤ects Jevonss reasoning that he is mistakenly led to
think that, as the motion of a material point in mechanics can be obtained
by integrating its velocity function with respect to time, so in economic
dynamics the joint trajectorydescribed in the space of allocations by the
commodity holdings of two traders involved in a bilateral trading process
can (or at least should) be obtained by integrating with respect to time the
di¤erential "ratio of exchange" between the two commodities, as deter-
mined, at each instant, by the trading activity of the two traders (Jevons,
1970, p. 138). Yet, this analogy is grossly misleading: for, unlike the motion
of a material point in space, the motionsof the commodity holdings of one
or more "trading bodies" in the space of allocations need not take place con-
tinuously, by di¤erential displacements, nor be viewed as a function of time.
In e¤ect, as we have seen, Jevons himself is eventually forced to conclude
that, in his own "theory of exchange", the "equilibrium state" determined
by the "exchange equations" must be regarded as instantaneously reached
through a nitetrade, carried out at a constant "ratio of exchange" in a
single step (Jevons, 1970, pp. 138-9, 143).
Jevonss repeated recourse to mechanical analogies, far from providing
any solution to the substantive issues at stake, reveals what is perhaps the
main cause of his inability to overcome the limitations of his theory: under
29That Jevons is only interested in observables is also conrmed by his discussion of the
determination of the (observable) quantity of a commodity purchased by a "small trader"
taking the (observable) market-clearing price as "approximately xed" (Jevons 1970, pp.
150-2) or by his discussion of the relationship between quantities traded and market-
clearing prices (both observable magnitudes) in markets for staples over long periods of
time under assumedly unchanging conditions on the demand side (see Jevons (1970, pp.
175-83) and Black (1977c, pp. 16-7; see also Bostaph and Shieh (1987) and White (1989,
p. 443)). Finally, a further indirect conrmation of Jevonss stance on this issue comes
from Ryletts Lecture Notes when, in the context of a discussion of the "laws of supply
and demand", one can nd sentences like the following one: "The denite idea rst to
be attached to supply and demand is that they are quantities, not mental states" (Black,
1977c, p. 81).
30Such a simile is worked out in detail by Edgeworth (1981, p. 24), in an attempt to
rationalize Jevonss approach.
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the spell of his mechanical bias, Jevons is unable to recognize the ultimate
problem of the individualistic social sciences, namely, the problem of the
interaction among individually optimizing agents, a problem for which no
reliable analogy can be found in the physical sciences31.
9 Conclusions
With specic reference to the "theory of exchange", Jevons is able to identify
the competitive equilibrium conditions for a two-trader, two-commodity
model of an Edgeworth Box economy with cornered traders. But he is
unable either to convincingly explain how such an equilibrium is attained, or
to extend his restricted model to more general exchange economies, allowing
for non-corneredtraders, on the one hand, and arbitrary nite numbers of
traders and/or commodities, on the other.
In order to correct the many shortcomings of his "theory of exchange"
and to overcome its limitations, Jevons might have embraced either one of
two alternative approaches: either the game-theoretic, coalitional approach,
leading to the solution concept of the core, that Edgeworth will fully de-
velop in 1881, taking precisely Jevonss "theory" as his starting point; or
the general competitive equilibrium approach, fully developed by Walras in
1874-7, but partly anticipated by Jenkin in his correspondence with Jevons
in 1868.
Jevons is completely blind to the rst way-out, even if it probably rep-
resents the most natural extension of his own view of the trading process
as a sequence of bilateral bargains: Jevonss blindness to this solution is
indirectly proven by his inability to write down and characterize the equa-
tion of the "contract curve", even if he comes very close to perceiving its
existence. But Jevons cannot endorse the Walrasian solution either, for it
conicts with his aversion to the use of counterfactual reasoning and non-
observational concepts in the "theory of exchange".
Due to these reasons, Jevonss "theory" cannot be generalized and has to
31Contrary to what has frequently been maintained (see, e.g., Mirowski (1989)), mar-
ginalistic or neoclassical economics ought not to be regarded as an o¤spring, albeit
illegitimate, of the physical sciences. Of course it is true that, at the dawning of the
approach, the attempts to slavishly imitate such sciences and to nd spurious analogies
therein abound. But, as Jevonss, Walrass, Edgeworths, and Paretos unsuccessful e¤orts
in that direction abundantly prove, such endeavors have only slackened the pace of neo-
classicaleconomics and hindered the understanding of its true foundations. On Paretos
mechanical dream, as can be found expressed especially in Pareto (1896-97), see Donzelli
(1997).
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remain formally restricted to the two-trader, two-commodity, competitive
equilibriummodel, with reference to which it had originally been conceived.
Jevonss surreptitious attempts at providing more extensive and liberal in-
terpretations of his "theory" explain the ambiguities surrounding some of
its crucial theoretical concepts and propositions, such as the concept of a
"trading body" and the so-called "law of indi¤erence". Jevonss refusal to
take prices as unknown parameters in explaining individual choices, a re-
fusal probably linked to his physicalist or mechanical bias, prevents him not
only from exploiting Jenkins theoretical suggestions, as advanced in the
latters 1868 correspondence with Jevons, but also from employing any sort
of demand-and-supply analysis of the Walrasian type in the development of
his "theory of exchange", and, nally, from discussing anything like an equi-
libration process based on the adjustment of prices to the (possibly virtual)
occurrence of aggregate excess demands on the markets for commodities.
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